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Abstract
Emerging and re-emerging infections and possible bioterrorism acts will continue to challenge both the medical community and civilian
populations worldwide, urging health authorities to respond rapidly and effectively. Established in 2005, the European Community
(EC)-funded European Network of Biosafety-Level-4 laboratories (Euronet-P4), which brings together the laboratories in Porton Down,
London, Hamburg, Marburg, Solna, Lyon and Rome, seeks to increase international collaboration in the areas of high containment
laboratory biosafety and viral diagnostic capability, to strengthen Europe’s capacity to respond to an infectious disease emergency, and
to offer assistance to countries not equipped with such costly facilities. Network partners have agreed on a common strategy to ﬁll the
gaps identiﬁed in the ﬁeld of risk group-4 agents’ laboratory diagnosis, namely the lack of standardization and of reference samples. The
network has received a further 3-year funding, to offer assistance to external laboratories, and to start the planning of ﬁeld activities.
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Introduction
Among the threats that the world population faces in the
21st Century, the emergence of newly-emerging or re-
emerging viral diseases [1,2] has the potential of affecting
the public health systems worldwide, posing challenges of
varying severity, from a due concern as in the case of the
human monkeypox cases in the USA [3] to real interna-
tional emergencies as has been the case with severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) [4], and as is feared might
happen in the future with an inﬂuenza pandemic. The SARS
experience in particular has taught the scientiﬁc community
a very important lesson: that a global health crisis can be
effectively countered and brought to an end through an
international effort of communication and cooperation, as
opposed to local initiatives or uncoordinated actions. This
lesson has been widely accepted by the European infectious
disease community and networking has become a major
approach to tackling potential challenges, as demonstrated
by the number of networks and collaborative projects
funded by the European Community in the last few years:
ENIVD (European Network for the diagnosis of Imported
Viral Diseases) [5], EUNID (European Network of infec-
tious disease physicians) [6], EURONHID (European Net-
work of Highly Infectious Diseases) [7], ETHREAT
(European training for health professionals on rapid
responses to health threats) [8], ETIDE (European training
for infectious disease emergencies) [9], RIVIGENE (Geno-
mic inventory, forensic markers, and assessment of poten-
tial therapeutic and vaccine targets for viruses relevant in
biological crime and terrorism) [10], the VHF-Variola PCR
project [11], and Biosafety Europe [12], just to mention a
few. In the present review, we present the main activities
of the European Network of Biosafety-Level-4 (BSL-4)
laboratories [13,14] in the area of viral diagnostics and
biosafety, and we discuss the challenges and critical points
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identiﬁed, as well as our future steps to ensure that Europe
can be prepared to face an unexpected event involving a
highly dangerous pathogen.
There are currently four levels of biosafety for laboratories
[15–19]. The ﬁrst level is for agents that do not pose a signiﬁ-
cant threat to human health. Level two is intended for those
that present a low to moderate risk. Level three is where
potentially lethal pathogens are handled. The fourth level of
biosafety is restricted to the most dangerous pathogens
known to date, among which are the causative agents of viral
haemorrhagic fevers and smallpox, usually referred to as risk
group 4 (RG-4) agents in international laboratory biosafety
guidelines [15–17] and European legislation [18,19]; some of
these agents are also included in the list of agents likely to be
used as bioweapons [20]. Although the classiﬁcation of infec-
tious agents into four risk groups varies slightly according to
the WHO, the European Community or the US Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, the levels of biosafety are
clearly deﬁned on the basis of the hazard posed to the health
care worker or the community. An agent belonging to a given
risk group will be handled at a corresponding or higher
biosafety level, depending on the procedures employed.
The BSL-4 laboratory is the conventional environment
where pathogens can be handled under the safest conditions, a
state-of-the-art technical facility, designed and built in compli-
ance with the highest standards of safety and security, where
only staff that have undergone extensive and continuous
training programmes can be granted permission to work. This
aims to ensure that all activities are performed according to
the basic principles of safety, which are translated into a set of
strict procedures to guarantee that no infectious agent will
ever escape from the laboratory. The highest level of biosafety
is always required for the development of new diagnostic tests
and vaccines for RG-4 agents, as well as for testing the efﬁcacy
of new anti-viral drugs against them. The use of a BSL-4 labora-
tory is also strongly recommended when working on
newly-recognized agents whose dangerousness has not yet
been assessed.
There are currently seven internationally recognized BSL-
4 laboratories in the European Union, in ﬁve countries (UK,
Germany, Sweden, Italy, France) and additional facilities are
under construction or are being planned [21]. To enhance
preparedness for emergencies, high-containment laboratories
need to share reagents, experience, and lessons learned, and
this is the reason why collaboration and information sharing
have become mandatory.
The European Network of BSL-4
Laboratories Responds to a Recognized
Need for International Cooperation
The European Network of BSL-4 Laboratories (Euronet-P4)
was created in 2005 in response to a call by the European
Commission [13]. Although some form of scientiﬁc collabo-
ration among the few BSL-4 laboratories was at that time
already established [11], the aim of the European Commis-
sion was to increase collaboration and to organize the exist-
ing BSL-4 laboratories into a network of expertise to enable
a rapid, effective and coordinated response to health threats
to European populations resulting from natural infection by
RG-4 agents or their deliberate release. The network
involves six partner institutions from ﬁve EU countries (UK,
Germany, Sweden, Italy and France), with the addition of
three other laboratories which are currently not funded by
the grant, but are involved in the planning or construction of
new European BSL-4 facilities, and participate in network
activities as observers (one additional representation from
Germany, one from Austria and one from France). Partner
laboratories and observers are listed in Table 1.
The work of the network focuses on the following
objectives: to establish a coordinated and accessible BSL-4
TABLE 1. Euronet-P4 partners and
invited observers
Lead partner National Institute for Infectious Diseases IRCCS ‘
L. Spallanzani’ – Rome, Italy
Partner Bernhard Nocht Institute for Tropical Medicine – Hamburg,
Germany
Partner Philipps Universita¨t Marburg – Marburg, Germany
Partner Health Protection Agency – Centre for Infections (CfI),
London, and Centre for emergency preparedness and
response, Porton Down UK
Partner Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease Control – Solna,
Sweden
Partner Laboratoire P4 Jean Merieux, Inserm – Lyon, France
Invited observer O¨sterreichische Agentur fu¨r Gesundheit und
Erna¨hrungssicherheit – Wien, Austria
Invited observer Robert Koch Institut – Berlin, Germany
Invited observer Unite´ des Virus Emergents, Faculte´ de Me´decine,
Universite´ de la Me´diterrane´e – Marseille, France
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infrastructure for the surveillance and diagnosis of RG-4
agents; to review current laboratory diagnostic capability for
RG-4 agents and to disseminate best practice within the
network; to facilitate the development of new hazard-free
diagnostic tests suitable to be transferred to other
non-BSL-4 laboratories in all Member States; to establish
communication channels for information exchange among
National, European and International Health Authorities; and
to standardize policies and procedures of biosafety and
biosecurity. All project results are presented and discussed
in meetings that are held twice yearly, which bring together
partners and observers, and are posted on the project’s
secured web site [13].
Biosafety: Different Standards, One
Common Goal
Biosafety can be deﬁned as the combination of structural char-
acteristics of the facility, use of sophisticated equipment and
adherence to stringent procedures, which all together ensure
that any infectious agent handled within a laboratory will never
reach and contaminate the external environment. It is
currently a topic of much discussion, as demonstrated by the
number of published guidelines and manuals [15–19] and
articles on the subject [21–24], and there is a well recognized
need for set standards and minimal requirements to aid in the
process of certifying both new and existing laboratories.
Existing BSL-4 laboratories are of two types: those based
on the use of full-body protective suits (often referred to as
‘space suits’), and the so-called cabinet lines, also known as
Class-III Biosafety cabinets or glove-boxes. The ﬁrst basic
principle adopted in both is physical separation between the
health care worker and the infectious material. To this end,
the former type relies on personnel wearing positive-pres-
sure suits connected by hoses to an air supply, whereas, in
the latter, the same goal is achieved through the use of spe-
cial sealed cabinets with built-in thick rubber gloves through
which the health care worker reaches inside (Fig. 1, Fig. 2).
Another important principle is containment, ensured by con-
stantly maintaining the air inside the laboratory under nega-
tive pressure, and by the use of interlocked doors. Intake
and exhaust air are ﬁltered through high-efﬁciency particulate
air ﬁlters: this is usually carried out once for intake air and
twice for the exhaust. Among the procedures common to all
BSL-4 facilities are the complete inactivation of all infectious
waste leaving the laboratory, by autoclaving or chemical dis-
infection; and the lengthy exit procedures, which include a
chemical shower to disinfect the external surface of the suit
followed by a body shower, and the removal of all personal
protective equipment in a precise order. Of the seven BSL-4
laboratories operating in Europe, four use protective suits
and three use glove boxes. All are national reference centres
funded by their respective National Health Authorities, and
were built in compliance with national registration schemes
and international guidelines. Their structural characteristics
vary considerably as a consequence of the fact that they
were built in different countries in the absence of speciﬁc
regulations and over a period of two decades, rather than as
a reﬂection of different biosafety requirements. The reaching
of a consensus on a common standard for biosafety practices
was discussed in project meetings and it soon proved to be
a difﬁcult objective to achieve; by contrast, there was unani-
mous agreement on the necessity to provide assistance to
other European countries in the process of setting up high
containment facilities, with the aim of making the experience
of long-established facilities available to new ones from the
initial planning stages.
TABLE 2. Examples of outbreaks or
international alerts involving RG-4
viruses reported annually in inter-
national bulletins or in ProMed-mail
(http://www.promed-mail.org)
Year Country Disease Number of cases Source
2000 Uganda Ebola 426 (172 deaths) WHO
2003 Congo Rep Ebola 35 (29 deaths) WHO
2004 Sudan Ebola 17 (seven deaths) WHO
2004 Iran CCHF >30 cases (ﬁve deaths) ProMed posting
2005 Angola Marburg 368 (323 deaths) WHO
2005 Pakistan CCHF 40 (ﬁve deaths) ProMed posting
2005 Russia CCHF >100 cases ProMed posting
2006 Iran CCHF 46 (three deaths) ProMed posting
2006 Russia CCHF 41 (one death) ProMed posting
2006 Turkey CCHF 150 (11 deaths) Eurosurveillance weekly
release 20th July 2006
2007 Congo DR Ebola Up to 187 deaths WHO
2007/2008 Uganda Ebola 93 (22 deaths) WHO
2007/2008 Pakistan CCHF Three deaths ProMed posting
2008 Turkey CCHF 37 deaths ProMed posting
2008/2009 Congo DR Ebola 36 (12 deaths) WHO
Congo DR, Democratic Republic of the Congo; Congo Rep, Republic of the Congo; CCHF, Crimean–Congo
haemorrhagic fever.
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The Laboratory Diagnosis of Highly
Infectious Viral Agents: Gaps and
Challenges
Public health systems and clinical laboratories worldwide are
continually challenged by emerging and re-emerging viruses
[25–27], owing not only to natural outbreaks (Table 2)
[28–32] and potential acts of bioterrorism, but also to impor-
tation by returning travellers, as demonstrated by the recent
cases of imported diseases, some of which are summarized in
Table 3 [40–41]. When one such outbreak occurs, effective
infection control relies strongly on the availability of rapid and
effective diagnostic tests to identify infected individuals and
implement quarantine, especially for diseases for which there
is no vaccine or treatment. Once again, the SARS epidemic in
2003 was an example of how the implementation of infection
control measures, together with the effort of the scientiﬁc
community to rapidly identify the aetiological agent, contrib-
uted to controlling the spread of the disease [42–45].
At present, the diagnostics for emerging viruses are based
essentially on molecular methods (real time or RT-PCR,
sequencing, arrays), antigen detection techniques, serology,
virus isolation and microscopy, although less frequently
[46,47]. In European BSL-4 laboratories, virus isolation and
molecular biology assays are widely used, allowing safe identiﬁ-
cation of ﬁloviruses, arenaviruses, orthopoxviruses and Cri-
mean–Congo haemorrhagic fever virus; the same cannot be
said for electron microscopy studies and antigen capture
methods, most likely because these tests are considered to be
of low added value given the reliability of molecular testing and
virus isolation. Nevertheless, it should be stated that these,
perhaps ‘old fashioned’ and less sophisticated, techniques
could turn out to be an invaluable tool when dealing with a
mutated strain that escapes the highly speciﬁc binding require-
ments of molecular probes, and they should be considered in
the context of an epidemiological and clinical picture consis-
tent with a speciﬁc disease and a negative real-time PCR
result.
Serology diagnostics for RG-4 agents is the area that
presents the greatest difﬁculties, essentially due to the fact
that there are currently very few commercially available
diagnostic tests for these pathogens, whose identiﬁcation
relies almost completely on the use of in-house reagents
that need to be newly produced, and constantly veriﬁed and
validated [48–53]; indeed, the validation of these homemade
TABLE 3. Examples of cases of suspected or proven infection with RG-4 agents, occurring outside their natural context
(importation by returning travellers, and one laboratory accident)
Year Country Disease Patient Source
1971–2003 UK Lassa Ten cases in travellers returning from Sierra Leone or
Nigeria (one fatal in 2000)
[33]
2004 Russia (Siberia) Ebola Laboratory accident involving one scientist (fatal) [34]
2006 Germany Lassa Traveller returning from Sierra Leone (conﬁrmed case) [35]
2008 The Netherlands Marburg Traveller returning from Uganda (conﬁrmed case) [36]
2009 UK Lassa Traveller returning from Nigeria (conﬁrmed case, fatal) [37]
2009 USA Marburg Traveller returning from Uganda in 2008 (diagnosed
retrospectively)
[38]
2009 UK Lassa Traveller returning from Mali (conﬁrmed case, fatal) [39]
ECDC, European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control; CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
FIG. 1.Working with a class-III biosafety cabinet. FIG. 2. A view of the inside of a class-III biosafety cabinet.
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tests is a serious challenge because of the lack of an
adequate number of sera from infected patients to use as
reference biological materials, as well as of materials from
infected animals to be used as surrogates. It should be noted
that not many commercial companies would have an interest
in producing such tests, given the overall low number of
cases for which diagnosis would be required in the absence
of an emergency.
Importance of Networking in Preparing for
Future Emergencies
The threat posed by naturally occurring infections or deliber-
ate release of highly dangerous pathogens requires that coun-
tries act on a well established international programme of
cooperation. This need has long been recognized internation-
ally and several networks such as the WHO GOARN (Global
Outbreak Alert and Response Network) and the GHSAG-LN
(Global Health Security Action Group—Laboratory Net-
work) are in operation today, whereas another network for
‘high consequence pathogens’ is being established by the
WHO. In this context, it is essential that all the European
BSL-4 Laboratories coordinate with one another, exchange
expertise, and agree on a common strategy to improve the
capacity of responding to these natural or deliberate threats
to public health. Mutual recognition of laboratories and expe-
ditious channels of communication between them for
exchanging diagnostic protocols, samples, reagents when fea-
sible, and personnel for training will be essential to secure an
effective response to highly infectious disease emergencies
because it can be foreseen that, in some cases, the exchange
of information, expertise and materials could be made
increasingly difﬁcult by the growing strictness of both interna-
tional and national (as is the case for the USA) regulations
concerning bio-security [2,54,55].
The European Network of BSL-4 laboratories represents a
good example of successful cooperation; all participants are
respected as experts in the ﬁeld of highly infectious diseases,
and have links with all of the other European networks men-
tioned above [5–12]. Many of the project participants are also
linked with the WHO GOARN, are involved in the GHSAG-
LN, and participate regularly in international exercises.
Future Perspectives
The Network is currently organizing external quality assurance
exercises, to achieve standardization of the existing diagnostic
tests; the preparation of a biosafety checklist is also underway,
to offer new BSL-4 laboratories all the information, expertise
and training needed to become a reference centre for the
diagnosis of hazardous viruses in compliance with internation-
ally recognized standards. Furthermore, a feasibility exercise
regarding the development of a mobile laboratory suitable
for the safe handling of highly infectious pathogens (i.e.
covering technical requirements for establishment, biosafety,
maintenance, deployment and operation mode in the ﬁeld, and
budget estimation) will represent the stepping stone towards
the beginning of virological ﬁeld activities. Recent publications
have shown how the deployment of mobile laboratories in
outbreak areas may serve the dual purpose of diagnosing
infected individuals early, therefore facilitating the implementa-
tion of effective isolation of cases, and improving the available
diagnostic tests through validation against human sera
collected locally [56–60]. The purpose of a European mobile
BSL-4 laboratory (which, for all technical and biosafety aspects,
is also suitable for BSL-3 agents) would be to perform diagnos-
tics within Europe or in other countries where these agents
are endemic or outbreaks occur. It would not only increase
European preparedness by overcoming speciﬁc geographical
weaknesses represented by countries for which BSL-4 labora-
tories are probably too costly to build, operate and maintain,
but also, and above all, it would represent an invaluable
support and back-up during scaling up of investigations in
outbreak-prone countries, at the same time allowing the
search for more accurate and faster diagnostic tools to
proceed unhindered.
All of these activities are part of a wider strategy of collab-
oration among European countries and international organiza-
tions such as the WHO and the GHSAG-LN, which aims to
build our capacity to respond effectively to health threats.
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